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Banking Markets:   
Productivity, Risk and Customer Satisfaction
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Abstract:   A structural model is developed which incorporates bank decisions on
productivity, risk taking and customer satisfaction into an equilibrium model of banking
markets.  This structural model is estimated directly for 219 large US banks, 1984-1992. 
The results are: (i) banks differ widely in their ability to manage risk; (ii) there are
substantial inefficiencies due to demand/capacity mismatches; (iii) greater customer
satisfaction correlates with greater profitability, principally due to higher levels of demand;
(iv) very large bank-specific effects that previous research discovered appear to have been
largely captured in the structural model.
Key Words:  banking, structural estimation, quality, productivity, efficiency, riskBANKING MARKETS: PRODUCTIVITY, RISK, AND
CUSTOMER SATISFACTION
1. Introduction
The past fifteen years have seen substantial changes in banking markets.  Advances in computing and
telecommunications have driven these global changes, but they have been most pronounced in US
markets.  A voluminous literature has developed, in part as a result of these changes, which has generally
addressed two issues: (i) bank productivity, including economies of scale
1, economies of scope, and X-
efficiency; (ii) bank risk-taking and its costs.  Are banks the right size?  Do they have the appropriate
product scope?  Are they using “best practice” techniques?  How does size affect the efficiency of risk-
taking?  For a definitive review of this work, the reader is referred to Berger, Hunter, and Timme (1993).
Studies of economies of scale and scope have dominated the literature.  The consensus of the literature is
that for large banks, scale economies are largely nonexistent and scope economies are small, a result
confirmed in this paper.  Bank risk was examined in McAllister and McManus (1993), where an
inventory model to assess scale economies associated with risk pooling.  Hughes and Mester (1994) model
bank managers’ risk preferences, using the leverage ratio as their risk measure.  Additionally, Hughes and
Mester (1993) assess the impact of the “too-big-to-fail” doctrine on bank risk-taking, a matter we consider
in this paper.
More recent innovations in the literature have focused on (i) the use of the profit function rather than the
cost function, to help identify both demand side and supply side effects (see Berger, Hancock, and
Humphrey (1993)); and (ii)  the use of frontier methods to identify possible X-inefficiency.  A series of
papers has explored various methods for frontier estimation: data envelopment analysis, efficient frontier
analysis, “thick” frontier analysis, and “distribution-free analysis”.  Berger (1993) provides a discussion
and analysis of these various methods and their differences in the context of banking. Kaparakis, Miller,
and Noulas (1994) use a stochastic frontier approach and find that bank size, in particular the number of
branches, has a negative impact on short-run efficiency.  Mester (1994) uses cost frontier methods to
assess the efficiency of banks in the Federal Reserve’s third district, finding significant X-inefficiencies.
Grabowski, Rangan, and Rezvanian (1994) use a nonparametric frontier approach to assess the effect of
deregulation on bank efficiency, finding a decline over the years 1979-1987, principally focused on
technical rather than allocative inefficiency.  Overall, these papers have identified potential X-
inefficiencies as substantially greater than either scale or scope effects, and have thus turned scholarly-    - 2
attention toward identifying possible sources for these large efficiency differences among banks.  For
example, Mester (1993) has examined efficiency differences between stock and mutual savings and loan
institutions, finding that the mutual form of ownership is associated with greater efficiency.
In this paper, three questions are addressed: (i) the cost of bank risk is assessed, using banks’ stock market
betas as a broad measure of total risk.
2  In particular, the effect of size on risk-taking is analyzed, as well
as the decomposition of risk on a product basis; (ii) productivity losses due to mismatches between
demand and capacity is modeled and estimated; (iii) the effect of customer satisfaction, or quality, on bank
profitability is measured.  Each of these issues is new (in varying degrees) to the literature.  Additionally,
the paper provides strong confirmation of previous research results on economies of scale and scope, and
it provides significant new evidence on the X-efficiency/frontier analysis issue.
There are several features of this paper, other than the questions addressed, that make this paper unique:
• Most of the previous empirical work employed reduced form estimation: a cost function or a profit
function is specified and its parameters are estimated.  In this paper, a full structural model is
developed: banks face long- and short-run cost function choices, they optimally choose capacity levels
and risk levels with limited information, and they interact in markets, leading to an asymmetric
Cournot-Nash equilibrium.  Each bank’s profit function is derived from the market equilibrium
conditions, and it’s parameters are directly estimated (in structural, not reduced, form).
• The empirical analysis incorporates six bank products, and develops a unified approach to thinking
about what a bank’s products are.  Specifically, this analysis includes off-balance-sheet items as an
individual product line; to date, only Hasan, Karels, and Peterson (1994) and Jagtiani, Nathan, and
Sick (1994) have examined this product line.
• The dataset on customer satisfaction is new to the literature, developed explicitly for this paper.
• Most of the previous empirical work examined one or a few very specific factors, attempting to
measure their impact in isolation from other decisions and activities undertaken by the firm.  In this
paper, all of the relevant factors are integrated into a single model, so that all parameters are
estimated simultaneously.
Developing an explicit integrated structural model of banking markets increases the complexity of the
analysis and increases the difficulty of estimation.  Further, this is not the standard approach in the
existing empirical banking literature.  The motivation to undertake this effort is two-fold.  First, deriving
the estimating equations from a model of maximizing agents, their opportunity and information sets, and
their market interactions tightly ties the empirical estimation to the underlying economics.  Second, with-    - 3
this approach, specific hypotheses of bank behavior that can be reflected in the economic model can be
explicitly estimated.  For example, mismatches in bank demand and bank capacity, due (possibly) to
management forecasting errors, are built into the economic model, so that allocative inefficiencies due to
this potential mismatch can be explicitly estimated for each bank.
This second point is particularly important, given the current state of the empirical banking literature.
Using the methods of frontier analysis, Berger and Humphrey (1991) have shown that there are large
unexplained differences among the cost functions of banks.  Berger, Hancock, and Humphrey (1993),
derive similar but more powerful results using a bank profit function.  Unfortunately, frontier methods (or
fixed effects methods, as used in this paper) simply allow us to characterize bank-specific effects that are
not captured in our models, but do not explain why it is that a bank is inefficient compared to other banks.
We have thus reached a limit on what econometric analysis can tell us using generic functional forms and
generic operating data (such as the Call Report data traditionally used for this purpose), if we wish to
understand the underlying economics of banking markets.  One ingenious approach to get beyond this
limit is in Berger, Leusner, and Mingo (1994), in which a generic cost function approach is combined
with a unique dataset on bank branches is used to estimate a specific type of potential inefficiency.  This
paper represents another approach: use generic banking data but with a richer structural model of banking
markets, combined with a unique dataset (customer satisfaction data) which prises open yet another
dimension for analysis.  As researchers are better able to model and then observe potential causes of
inefficiency, the fixed effects, which capture the unobserved variation among banks, become less
important.  The results of this paper take us a very long way toward that goal.
There are five distinct parts of our model of banks and banking markets.  (i)  operating activities ; each
bank is assumed to produce (at most) six products: demand deposits, time deposits, commercial and
industrial (C&I) loans, consumer loans, real estate loans, and off-balance-sheet items.  The short-run cost
of producing these six products is represented by a family of functions which capture potential
complementarities among the products.  The long-run cost function is the lower envelope of this family of
cost functions.  In each period, each bank chooses a short-run cost function based upon its estimates of
demand for its products.  These estimates may prove inaccurate, but its choice of technology is sunk (for
one period) so that the bank incurs a cost penalty, operating off the long-run cost function.  (ii)  risk; a
defining property of banks is that risk and risk management is at the core of their business.  Each product,
indeed each transaction, involves taking risk.  We measure the overall risk of the bank using the “beta” of
the bank’s stock, which captures not only credit and interest rate risk (such as would be associated with
loans and securities) but all business risk (for example, expanding into new geographical markets).  (iii)
the demand for banking products; the market demand functions capture potential cross-elasticities among
these six products.  (iv)  customer satisfaction , or quality; banks may differ in their ability to provide-    - 4
high-quality service, as defined by how satisfied their customers are.
3  For reasons explained below, we
treat the ability to deliver high quality (or not) as a  characteristic of a bank rather than as a choice the
bank makes.  (v) competitive interactions ; each bank having chosen a short-run cost function, all banks
within each metropolitan statistical area (MSA) then play a Cournot-Nash quantity game (involving six
markets); the output vector for each bank and price is determined as the equilibrium of this game.  It is an
asymmetric game, as banks in general will have chosen  different short-run cost functions and different
product risk levels, and therefore have different marginal costs.  This will result in different output vectors
for different banks in the same MSA.
The paper is organized as follows.  Section  2 lays out the five distinct components of the model.  Also
included in this section is our treatment of what a bank’s products are.  This issue has generated some
controversy in the literature, and our approach differs from any in the literature thus far; it is closest in
spirit to the user cost method, outlined in Berger and Humphrey (1992).  Section  3 uses these results to
derive the estimating equations.  In Section  4, the data is described, including how various anomalies in
the several datasets were treated. Section 5 contains the results of the estimation, and Section 6 lists our
conclusions as well as possible future research along the lines developed in this paper.
2. The Model
The model consists of four distinct components, which are described in turn.
Cost of Operating activities   A bank can offer up to six products:
1. Demand deposits;
2. Time deposits;
3. Commercial and Industrial (C&I) loans;
4. Consumer loans; this category includes credit card accounts as well as the usual consumer credit
loans such as automobile loans, etc.
5. Real estate loans; this includes home mortgages (though not mortgaged-backed securities) and
commercial real estate loans;
6. Off-balance-sheet items; we include in this category all counterparty guarantees, such as letters of
credit; we do not include futures contracts, such as swaps.
4-    - 5
Each bank’s production of these six outputs in a time period is measured by the outstanding stock of each
output on the bank’s balance sheet at the end of the period (for products 1-5, and analogously for product
6).  In the short run, production involves both fixed and variable costs; for each period, a bank must plan
for and invest in capacity before demand is realized, based upon, among other things, its demand
forecasts.  Each bank faces a  family of short-run cost functions  of the form
5
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where n n and a a are symmetric matrices common to the entire family of short-run cost functions. The bank
chooses a specific member of this family by selecting an  F and c = (c1,...,c6), which choice variables
completely characterize the menu of short-run cost functions.  In turn, the lower envelope of this family of
short-run cost functions defines the  long-run cost function ; for every output vector in the positive orthant,
q ˛R
6, there exists a short-run cost function that (i) is equal to the long-run cost function at  q; (ii) is
tangent to the long-run cost function at  q; and (iii) lies everywhere above the long-run cost function.
The long-run cost function is of the form
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where l l and g g are symmetric 6·6 matrices.  For each vector  q ~ in the positive orthant, there exists a unique
short-run cost function (F, c) defined by the total condition (i):
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We assume the second-order conditions are satisfied.-    - 6
The intuition here is straightforward.  Banks choose a short-run cost function from the available menu; if
they expect relatively low demand, they choose a low fixed cost, high variable cost technology.  If they
expect relatively high demand, they choose a high fixed cost, low variable cost technology.  The available
menu of short-run cost functions is defined by its lower envelope, which is therefore the long-run cost
function.
To help visualize these short-run and long-run cost functions, an example for two products is worked out
in detail and shown graphically in Figure 1.  The parameters of this example are:
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The long-run cost function is completely determined by the parameters  l l and g g.  All members of the
family of short-run cost functions share parameters  a a and n n.  We select a particular member of the family
of short-run cost functions by specifying an output vector  q ~ = (3,3) at which the short-run function is
tangent and equal to the long-run cost function.  We then solve for  F, c by solving equations ( 3) and (4),
which results in:
c1 = c2 = 0.071, F = 10.297
With these parameter values, the long-run cost function exhibits economies of scale and diseconomies of
scope.  The short-run cost function exhibits diseconomies of scale for reasonably large values of  q, and
economies of scope.  This is illustrated in the graph of the two functions, below.  Note that the cost
functions are equal and tangent at (3,3).-    - 7
Input Prices It will be noted that both our long-run and short-run cost functions include the output vector
but do not include input prices, as theory demands that they should.  Only if input prices are assumed
constant across banks and time periods is their omission justifiable.  Since all variables are in constant
(1982) dollars, inflation is not a source of variation in input prices.  However, other time-related factors
could cause variation in input prices, and more obviously, different sections of the country are likely to
have different wage rates, leading to different input prices.  In the estimation described below, however,
both time dummies and (high-wage) geographic area dummies are not significantly different than zero,
suggesting that such sources of variation are not present (or a perfectly canceled out by some other
unobserved effect).  Therefore, we maintain the assumption that variations in input prices are small
enough so that we may safely assume input prices are relatively constant and can therefore be ignored.
Cost of Risk Banks are unique in that the management of risk is the core of their business.  Yet our ability
to measure risk is much less than our ability to measure, say, the cost of processing checks.  In this paper,
we use market measures of risk, based on the theory of financial markets, in order to measure the
aggregate risk of the bank. Our risk measure is the bank’s (or its holding company’s) stock market beta,
the measure of risk that stockholders bear (and must be compensated for) derived from the Capital Asset
Pricing Model.  Beta measures the covariance of a stock’s price performance with that of the aggregate
market, fully reflecting the effects of stockholders’ portfolio diversification.
 6
Costs are normally denominated in dollars per unit time, while the stock market beta is a dimensionless
quantity.  Since we wish to treat risk cost like any other cost of the bank, we develop a transform of the
stock market beta which is a cost of risk commensurate with all other costs.  We quantify the bank’s total
risk cost as the difference between current earnings and what the earnings of the bank must be to achieve
the same value of the firm if the bank carried no risk.  Let the value of the bank be  V, the earnings of the
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and E  is the expectation operator.  The discount rate  s incorporates the stock market’s assessment of risk
b.
7  Define the uniform expected earnings  as p , the uniform certain level of earnings which would yield
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Now define the risk-free earnings  as ~ p , the uniform certain level of earnings which would yield the same

































Now the risk cost is defined to be the additional earnings,  p p - ~, that investors demand because of the









































normalizing by expected earnings,
risk / earnings ratio.
. (5)
Aggregate risk for a bank is comprised of risks from many individual transactions, each of which is
associated with a specific product.  We assume the most straightforward reduced form model that













A more general functional form involving higher order terms would no doubt conform more closely to our
view of risk.  However, we are estimating  bank-specific coefficients in this study, so the per-bank sample
size is quite limited, thereby restricting the parameters that can usefully be estimated.
8  As a result, we
must be content with capturing first-order effects only.
Demand  Total market demand for these products is interdependent and is given by the inverse demand
system
9:
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h =  are constant.  The more familiar self- and cross-elasticities can be obtained
from the flexibilities by inverting the flexibility matrix, and they are (of course) constant as well:
h e
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1 , the elasticity matrix.
Each firm k = 1,...,m supplies a portion q







Customer Satisfaction/Quality  Banks may differ in their ability and willingness to provide service
quality that leads to higher satisfaction of their customers.  Recent reports in the trade press suggest that
customer satisfaction may be a highly profitable strategy for banks.  “Financial marketers appear to have
overlooked the fundamental truth that the longer an institution keeps a customer, the more profitable the
customer becomes.  [Banks need ]...to maximize their satisfaction with [the] institution,” according to
Vavra (1995).  The inclusion of customer satisfaction in this analysis is unique among econometric
studies, and is merited not by its intrinsic interest but also by the current interest among practitioners in
quality.
The quality measure we use is an index derived from an extensive and long-standing survey of
commercial bank customers conducted by Greenwich Associates, Inc., a market research firm specializing
in the commercial banking sector.  The index merges survey responses into a single number, normalized
between 1 and 100, with a higher index number corresponding to greater customer satisfaction.
The details of the survey and the construction of the index from the survey instrument are discussed below
in Section 4.  We note here the key features of the index that validate its use in this study as a measure of
customer satisfaction: (i) actual bank customers are surveyed to assess their opinions regarding their
degree of satisfaction with their banking relationships.  (ii) The survey has been conducted annually for
over twenty years; the index is therefore based on a set of questions and responses that have been
consistent over the period of our study.  (iii) The survey results are considered informative by the banks
themselves, as attested to by the fact that Greenwich Associates’ principal source of income over this
period has been the sale of the survey results to individual banks.  The validity of the results has thus
passed a “market test.”
The quality measure may be modeled as either a choice variable of the bank, or a characteristic of the
bank over which it has little or no control in the short term.  In this paper, we treat quality as a
characteristic of the firm rather than a choice variable.  If the technology for providing quality in banking
were well-understood and completely diffused throughout the industry, then modeling it as a choice-    - 10
variable would be appropriate.  In our view, this is not the case. While banks were subject to the pervasive
regulation that characterized the industry pre-1980, it appears that quality was defined more by the brand
of toasters the bank gave depositors for opening accounts than by how well banks determined and then
provided what customers actually wanted. However, as competition intensified over the last fifteen years,
many banks have sought to differentiate themselves as high-quality providers as a means of competitive
advantage.  Pursuing this strategy requires a bank to actually learn how to provide high-quality service;
this strategy may require major changes within the bank, which may not easily be imitated.  Thus, the
diffusion of the technology of providing high-quality service could be rather slow, so that over the time
period of our study, banks had either acquired the technology or they hadn’t.  If this is an accurate
description of the diffusion of the technology of high-quality service, then treating quality as a
characteristic rather than a choice variable is more appropriate, and that is our rationale for so treating it.
There are several empirical implications of this assumption.  First, if quality is a choice variable, then in
equilibrium we would expect to see returns equalized across quality choice; high-quality banks would be
no more nor no less profitable than low-quality banks.  However, if quality is a characteristic of banks,
determined by the speed of diffusion of the technology, there may indeed be rents to providing high-
quality service.  Second, if quality is a choice variable, then in equilibrium we would expect that higher
quality necessarily results in higher cost.  If quality depends upon the relatively slow diffusion of a new
technology, then adopters of the new technology need not have higher costs; in fact, they could have lower
costs, if the technology both increases quality and reduces costs.
10
Unfortunately, the quality index constructed from the Greenwich Associates’ survey applies only to
commercial customers.  This suggests that the quality we measure affects only products associated with
this market segment.  The product most clearly associated with this segment is C&I loans.
11  Higher
quality can affect both demand and costs; if we denote the quality index by  X, then we modify the short-
run cost function (1) and the long-run cost function ( 2) as follows (assuming C&I loans are product 3):
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The sign of the exponent  d determines whether increasing quality increases or decreases cost.  Similarly,
the demand system ( 7) can be modified to reflect quality as well.  Since only C&I loans (product 3) are
affected, this reduces to:-    - 11









Assuming V > 0 , increasing quality increases customers’ willingness to pay.  To reduce notation in the
following exposition, we will suppress the explicit appearance of  X in the cost functions demand
functions.
In equilibrium, the market may respond to quality in two ways: banks may charge higher prices for higher
quality service, more business may come to higher quality banks, or both.  Thus, the effect of higher
quality service on bank profitability is potentially threefold: the ability to charge a price premium, a
higher level of demand, and a change in costs.  If quality is correctly viewed as a bank characteristic, then
we have no prediction of its effect on profitability.  If quality is a very slowly diffusing innovation which
banks are unable to adopt easily, then we would not expect that high quality would lead to lower profits,
but it could certainly lead to higher profits, especially during the period of slow diffusion where quality
rents may be possible.
Products and Prices  There is some controversy within the literature as to what a bank’s outputs are.  The
asset approach takes bank deposits as inputs and bank loans as outputs.  The user cost approach identifies
as outputs those items for which revenues exceed costs, and inputs as those assets for which costs exceed
revenues.  In this analysis, we adopt the user cost method, but with the special focus that it is the net
economic revenue, rather than the accounting revenue, that is the appropriate measure. We take the
measured quantities of each of the six products to be its stock in dollars.  This then focuses attention on
what the price of the six products specified above really is. The price of a loan that the bank makes to a
customer is obvious: it is the interest rate, denominated in dollars per dollar-year.  The  appropriate unit of
loan quantity is again obvious: the total amount of loans outstanding in a given year.
More difficult is the pricing of demand deposits, and it is to this that we now turn.  There are several types
of pecuniary transactions associated with demand deposits: (i) interest payments to depositors, usually
paid if a substantial minimum balance is held; (ii) various fees charged depositors, such as ATM usage,
returned checks, per-check fees, etc.  On balance, the total net revenue to a bank from these fees is very
small and can be negative.  What is missing from the pecuniary transactions is the opportunity cost of
demand deposits to depositors.  By keeping funds in a demand account, depositors are giving up earning
returns (in an equivalently low-risk instrument of equivalent liquidity) in exchange for the transaction and
depository services provided by the bank.  In turn, the bank gets the use of this money for loan purposes
while paying minimal interest costs.  Assume that the next best alternative for the bank’s customer is 90-
day Treasury bills (highly liquid, very safe), then the opportunity cost to the depositor is the interest rate
on the 90-day T-bills.  The total price that the customer pays, including opportunity cost, is the rate for-    - 12
90-day T-bills plus bank account fees minus bank interest payments.  A similar calculation applies to time
deposits, in which the customer is giving up potentially higher interest payments on T-bills for the
convenience of readily available insured deposits.  The implicit price is thus the 90-day T-bill rate minus
the bank interest rate on time deposits; this calculation generally yields a positive price paid by time
depositors for this service, though generally not as high a price as for demand deposits, for which the bank
typically provides more service.
If these opportunity costs are counted as a price the customer pays the bank, then “revenues” are attributed
to the bank that do not actually show up on its books.  Again, we use the opportunity cost approach to
handle this.  The bank uses these “free” (in the pecuniary sense) funds in order to make loans, funds it
would have to pay for if it did not have a deposit base to draw upon.  Therefore, the opportunity cost
“revenues” imputed from depositors should be imputed to borrowers.  Thus, the price of a loan to a
borrower is not the quoted interest rate, but that interest rate less the opportunity cost of funds collected
from depositors.  Bankers are familiar with this concept in the form of “net interest income;” interest from
borrowers less the cost of funds.  This approach differs in detail but not in spirit, and it permits the total
revenues of the bank to equal the booked revenues.  This pricing approach can be viewed as allocating
booked revenues to products based on an opportunity cost view of banking.
3.  Market Equilibrium and the Estimating Equations
In this section, the various parts of the model are brought together.  The model of the banking market is
developed and the equilibrium of the multiproduct game is derived.  Using these equilibrium conditions,
equations which depend only upon observables and parameters are derived; these are the equations to be
used to estimate the model parameters.
Information and Timing of Play  Prior to the beginning of each period, the managers of each bank  k
must decide on the short-run cost function to deploy for the coming period, which requires that they
commit to a fixed cost  Fk
 prior to observing actual demand conditions. This amount is fixed in the short
run and cannot be changed until the beginning of the next period.
12 Bank managers are assumed to  know
a a, g g, l l, n n, and equations (3) and (4), but they do not know next period’s demand.  In order to optimally
choose the short-run cost function, banks must  forecast demand, choosing the cost function which
minimizes their expected cost over the forecast distribution.
A model of how banks can optimally do this is presented in Appendix A.  Two key features of this model
are: (i) since banks use private information in their forecasts, their optimal choice of short-run cost
functions will differ; (ii) bank  k’s choice of cost function can be expressed as a choice of “planned-for”-    - 13
demand  ( ,..., ) q
k k
n
k q q = 1 , which is not necessarily equal to expected demand.  If banks are making
unbiased forecasts, then if costs are nonlinear it will be efficient to choose a planned-for demand not equal
to its expected demand.  Thus, any mismatches between capacity and demand may be an efficient response
to forecast uncertainty.
On the other hand, bank managers may exhibit a bias in their capacity planning.  Banks which are
consistently over-optimistic will tend to have excess capacity in most periods, while under-optimistic
banks will tend to be short on capacity.  If such mismatches of demand and capacity are due to bias, then
these mismatches represent allocative inefficiency.  An objective of this analysis is to determine the extent
of allocative inefficiency due to this source.
We denote the total bias of the bank by  m









, for i =1,...,6, and all time periods. (8)
The bias m
k  is a bank-specific parameter to be estimated.
Market Equilibrium  We assume that  the number of banks in the market is fixed.  In the case at hand, we
identify metropolitan statistical areas (MSA) as the relevant banking markets.  At the beginning of the
period, demand is revealed.  All banks in the market then play a Cournot-Nash quantity game, now with
full knowledge of demand  Q, in which they offer qk (not necessarily equal to q
k) in the market.
The timing of the game is illustrated in Figure 1.
Figure 1-    - 14
The form of the game suggests two questions: (i) is the Cournot-Nash assumption reasonable for these
markets? and (ii) are banks the only players in these six product markets?  In fact, the Cournot quantity
game with a fixed number of players is uniquely suited to banking markets.  Entry into these markets is
restricted (though not prohibited) by government regulation, so that the “no entry “ assumption is a
reasonable though not perfect approximation to reality, especially for larger banks.  Prices tend to be
market-determined, and are often strongly affected by capital market activity over which banks have little
effect.  By choosing capacity, such as size of branch network, extent of trading activities, number of credit
officers hired and trained, banks are choosing quantities to offer the market, coincident with the Cournot
quantity game.
More troubling is our assumption that the banks in our sample are the only players in the game.  In fact,
there are many more players in these markets, including smaller banks, non-bank financial institutions,
and commercial paper markets. In virtually all of the products in this model, banks in our sample compete
with institutions not in our sample.  Lack of available data on these non-bank institutions constrains all
researchers from addressing this issue.  The results of this paper, as well as the results of virtually the
entire empirical banking literature, must be understood in light of this deficiency.
Another concern is our assumption that the relevant market is the MSA.  For retail products and many
middle market products this is a good assumption.  However, for some services such as corporate loans the
market may well be national.  This suggests that the market share of banks is less than that used here, so
that price-cost margins would also be less.
Bank k chooses the quantity vector  qk to maximize economic profit.  Using equations ( 1) and (6), this can
be written as:
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which are, respectively, the share of product  j total revenues relative to product  i total revenues, the
flexibility of price  j with respect to quantity  i (constant for the assumed functional form of the demand
system), and the market share of firm  k for the jth product.
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Now the marginal cost of product  i for firm k consists of two parts: the operations cost and the risk cost:
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solving out the full FOC for the coefficient  ci
k we obtain:
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This equation specifies  what c must have been for firm k, based on the observations  p and qk, as well as
the parameters a a, n n, and h h.  We denote this relationship c p q
k k ( , ; , , ) a a n n h h .
Equation (3) shows that Fk also depends upon ~ q
k , so equation (8) can be used to express  Fk as a function
of the bank-specific parameters  m
k  and observables  q
k . Bank k’s profit can be expressed as a function of
parameters and observables:
p n
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Estimating Equations  Economic profit cannot be observed from the books of the bank, as it includes risk
costs, among other possible costs not accounted for.  We assume in this work that risk costs are the only
costs that do not appear on banks’ books, so that economic profit is equal to accounting earnings (which is
observable) less risk cost:  pk = pk - Rk.  Rk in turn depends upon market observables  rf, rm, and bk, as
well as the growth rate gk .  In addition, we also include a dummy variable  B
k   for each bank.  These are
the fixed effect coefficients, designed to assess any bank-specific effects not picked up by the parameters of
the model.-    - 16
There are thus two estimating equations, one for risk and the other for operational activities.  We use
actual bank earningsp
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Everything in these two equation is either observable ( p
k , rf, rm, bk, p, qk), is a parameter (a a, g g, n n, l l,   m,
B),  or is derived from observables and parameters ( ck, Fk).  Therefore, we can estimate it using nonlinear
methods.  Note that these two equations are not simultaneous.
Fixed Effects and Frontier Methods   Much of the recent work in the empirical banking literature has
used frontier methods to examine bank efficiency differences that are not explained by the parameters of
the model.  The principal feature of all frontier methods in bank panel data is the derivation of the
“efficient frontier”, either cost or profit, from consistent differences in bank-specific residuals.  The idea is
that banks with consistently high (for profit) residuals identify the “best practice frontier,” and that banks
with lower residuals are off this frontier and are thus X-inefficient, in the sense of Leibenstein (1966).
These methods are best viewed as consisting of two parts: (i) the identification of consistent differences
among banks based on their average residual or similar measure; (ii) the inference from these differences
that banks with the most favorable average residuals represent a “best practice frontier.” There is no
question that the recent work has been extremely valuable in that it has uncovered very large systematic
differences among the costs and profitability of banks; these differences are so large as to dwarf potential
scale and scope economies (see Berger and Humphrey (1991)).  However, this value inheres in the first
part of the analysis.  The second part, in which inferences are made about the best practice frontier on the
basis of these differences, appears to be more speculative.  The assumption of frontier analysis is that the
observed differences among firms are due to “superior management of resources” (Berger (1993)).
However, differences in banks’ abilities to manage resources should in principle be observable, if the
relevant variables are included in the model.  Significant observed fixed effects are best viewed as a
measure of our ignorance, as an indication that researchers need to look harder for possible omitted
variables.  Therefore, our approach in this paper is to focus exclusively on the systematic differences
among banks, and not on inferences regarding “best practice” frontiers.-    - 17
To do so, we use a fixed effects model, in which a dummy variable is included for each bank.  This is the
function of the variable B
k in equation (14).  In this analysis, the role of B
k is to measure the extent to
which bank-specific factors which we have not included in the model are important in determining bank
profitability.
4. The Data
Three different datasets were employed in this study:  operating data, capital market data, and customer
satisfaction data.
Operating Data  This data is taken from the Report of Condition and Income (“Call Report”), which all
insured banks operating in the US are required to file with Federal regulators.  We use quarterly data,
from 1984 to 1992 inclusive, for all banks with over $1 billion in assets in 1984.  The variables in this
dataset include:
quantities; end-of-period balance sheet entry for each bank for each of the six products listed;
revenues; total period net revenue for each bank for each of the six products listed;
earnings; income before extraordinary items and after taxes for each bank.
All quantities are expressed in thousands of 1982 dollars.
This data is collected from the banks themselves by the FDIC, which is maintains the dataset.  It is
accounting data.
Capital Market Data  This data is taken from the CRSP (Center for Research in Stock Prices) dataset,
which contains end-of-day prices of stocks traded on major exchanges and other securities, such as bonds.
The variables in this dataset include:
market rate of return ; this is the total return (dividends plus capital gain) for the NYSE.
risk-free rate of return ; this is the interest rate on 90-day Treasury bills.
beta; the b of each bank for each quarter was computed using the actual price data together with
the market rate and the risk-free rate.-    - 18
This data is collected from US stock markets by the Center for Research in Stock Prices at the University
of Chicago.  It is market data.
The mapping from banking institutions listed on stock exchanges to banks listed in the Call Report is not
trivial.  The reporting unit for the Call Report is a state bank; often, this bank is part of a holding
company that operates banks in several states.  In turn, this company may be owned by another holding
company, whose assets in principle could include non-banking firms.  It is generally the “highest” holding
company that is listed on a stock exchange.  Even the mapping from “high holding companies” reported
to the FDIC and stock exchange listing is not trivial; after extensive detective work, 219 of the banks with
greater than $1 billion in 1984 assets were identified for which their high holding company was listed on
a stock exchange.  The holding companies often held more than one bank in the sample, and may well
have held other firms, all of which contributed to their risk.  In this analysis, the high holding company’s
beta was imputed to all its subsidiaries.
Not all banks had data which covered the entire period.  Indeed, many banks were merged into new banks
during this period.  Since there is nothing in the model that is inherently dynamic, these mergers did not
constitute a problem; as of the date of the merger, the old banks dropped from the dataset and the new one
was inserted.  The total number of data points (banks  · quarters) is 6190.
Customer Satisfaction Data  This data is taken from an ongoing survey conducted by Greenwich
Associates, Inc., a marketing research firm that has been conducting surveys of commercial customers of
US banks since 1972.  The survey is designed to elicit from customers (i) their degree of satisfaction with
the banks they do business with; and (ii) the specific factors and attributes important to them, and how
their banks fared on these items.  From this extensive survey data, Greenwich Associates constructed a
single index, expressly for this study, to measure overall customer satisfaction for each bank.  The details
of the survey methods and the construction of the index is contained in Appendix B.  The key points about
this index: (i) it is scaled to range from 0 to 100, with a mean of 50; higher scores correspond to greater
customer satisfaction; (ii) only commercial customers are surveyed; thus, the quality index only applies to
commercial products, in particular C&I loans; (iii) due to data limitations, only 112 banks (from our
larger sample) are included, during the period 1985 to 1992.  The surveys are conducted annually (at
most), so quarterly data is not available.  The total number of data points (banks  · years) is 476.
5. Empirical Results
The empirical results are presented in three parts.  First, the results of the  risk estimation are presented, as
equation (13) can be estimated by itself.  Next, the results of the  operating results estimation  are-    - 19
presented, and last the results of the  quality estimation.  While these last two are nominally simultaneous,
certain regularities in the data permit their separation.
Risk Estimation The risk cost/earnings ratio (on the left-hand side of ( 13)) was computed
13 for each bank
in each quarter for which data was available.  The empirical cumulative distribution of the mean (across
all quarters) of this ratio is plotted below:

























































On average, the cost of risk accounts for 38% of earnings.  If we use actual earnings as a proxy for
uniform expected earnings, then the cost of risk is about 3% of booked cost. More interesting is the rather
substantial spread of risk/earnings; for some banks risk accounts for 2/3 of their booked earnings,
indicating that accounting earnings overstates their economic profit by a factor of three.  Other banks
apparently are able to manage risk more successfully, achieving negative  b ‘s and leading to an economic
profit greater than accounting earnings.  This suggests that the ability to manage risk well is a scarce
resource in banking.
The period of study was a turbulent one for banking markets, with very good times alternating with very
bad times.  These time patterns are evident in the plot of the mean and standard deviation of the risk cost-
earnings ratio by year:-    - 20
Average and Standard Deviation of 




























The effect of the S&L crisis is clearly evident in the increase in mean risk-earnings ratio for 1986, and
particularly the large one-time increase in the standard deviation of the distribution across banks.  The
progressively greater riskiness of all banks into the early 1990s is evident in the mean risk; the fact that
this increasing riskiness applied to all banks is suggested by the relatively stable standard deviation over
this period.
Perhaps even more interesting is the relationship between size and risk.  For banks under $1 billion in
assets, McAllister and McManus (1993) found that increasing size permitted lower risk costs for banks
resulting from inventory economies.  Our findings, based on banks over $1 billion in assets and a stock
market-based risk measure, are overall that the risk-earnings ratio is increasing in bank size.  A linear
regression of annual risk-earnings ratio on bank revenues yields a positive coefficient that is significant at
the 99% level. .  However, the relationship between size and risk is a complex one; in order to understand
the fine structure of the data, the nonparametric curve-fitting Trewess method (Velleman, 1980) was used.
The data and results of these analyses:-    - 21
Figure 4
The Trewess fit yields interesting results: risk decreases with size for very small banks (< $1.5 M in
revenues) and then increases sharply with size up to about $15 M in revenues, and is then relatively
constant for larger banks.
The decrease of risk for very small banks is consistent with the results of McAllister and McManus
(1993).  The increase in risk with size is more puzzling.  There are at least three possible explanations of
the positive and significant risk-size relationship: (i) it is possible that as banks increase in size and layers
of management, effective control of risk in the field is more difficult.  (ii) It could also be that large banks
become large by management’s overly aggressive growth, which drives them to utilize excess capacity
with riskier business.  (iii) It may also be an optimal response to the so-called “too big to fail” doctrine; if
bank managers and depositors of large banks are protected from losses, they are encouraged to undertake
riskier actions.  Equity holders are not so protected, so these risky actions are reflected in what equity
investors are willing to pay for the shares of such banks.
The first two hypotheses would suggest that risk would increase with size without limit, which is not what
we observe.
14  The “too big to fail” hypothesis, however, is consistent with our observations; for banks
between $2.5 M and $18 M there is some probability that in the event of a failure they will be bailed out,
and this probability is increasing in size.  The higher this probability, the more willing the bank managers
are to engage in risky behavior, as they may avoid exposure to this risk via a bailout.  Banks above $18 M
are virtually assured of a bailout, so that increasing size does not yield increases in risk-taking; these-    - 22
banks are already at the maximum risk they wish to take, given the costs of bailouts.  Note that this result
is consistent with that of Hughes and Mester (1993).
Operating Results  The estimation of equation ( 14) presents several problems.  The first problem is the
number of parameters and the estimating equation’s nonlinearity.  The full model has 99 structural
parameters (a, g, l, n a, g, l, n), 219 intercept dummies (B
k ) and 219 slope dummies (m
k ).  The full model is
estimated using an iterative procedure; first, the dummy variables are assumed known and the 99
parameters are estimated using nonlinear least squares.  Second, the estimated structural parameters are
assumed known, the intercept dummies set equal to the bank average residuals, and the slope dummies are
estimated using nonlinear least squares.  These dummy values are then used to repeat the first step; the
procedure is continued until convergence of all parameters is achieved.
The second problem is that while the operating results are available for 6190 data points, the quality
results are only available for a subset of size 473, a reduction of over an order of magnitude.  The loss of
degrees of freedom involved in this reduction of sample size, especially with a nonlinear equation, is
substantial.  The full model was therefore estimated in four configurations: (i) the full 6190 sample,
without quality; (ii) an annual sample of 1533 data points,
15 without quality; (iii) the reduced sample of
473, without quality; and (iv) the reduced sample of 473,  with quality.  The structural parameter estimates
were nearly identical for all four configurations; however, the standard errors of the estimates differed
substantially, with the largest sample size yielding rather good estimates of many parameters.  The
stability of the parameter estimates suggested a sequential estimation strategy: estimate the operating
parameters using the 6190 dataset, then reduce the fitted values to the 473 dataset to estimate only the
quality parameters.  In this section, therefore, the results of the operating estimation is reported.
Initial estimates of the full model yielded insignificant results for both the long-run and the short-run cost
coefficients for the following cross-terms (refer to Section  2 for product numbers): (1,2), (1,3), (1,4), (2,4),
(2,5), (2,6), (3,4), (3,5), (3,6), (4,5), (4,6).







log likelihood -49045.23-    - 23
Scale Effects  Ray scale economies are defined in the usual way.  For a scalar  h and any output vector  q,
































with {constant returns, increasing returns, decreasing returns} to scale as  s LR  is {=,<,>} 1.  It is clear
from this formula that if all g ij ‡ 0 5 . , then there cannot be increasing returns to scale.  If the inequality
is strict for at least one coefficient, then there are decreasing returns to scale.  Inspection of the left-hand
side of Table 2 shows that this is indeed the case.  All coefficients are either not significantly different
from 0.5, or they are significantly greater than 0.5 (g g 11 23  and possibly  ).
The scale analysis of the short-run cost functions is complicated by the fact that the fixed costs lead to a
weak form of scale economies: “spreading the fixed cost.”  However, if we examine only variable costs,
the left-hand side of Table 2 shows highly significant increasing marginal cost, with no coefficient
significantly less than 0.5 and all the direct coefficients significantly above this number.
Table 2
Estimate Std. Error p-Value* Estimate Std. Error p-Value*
g 11 0.923659 0.114651 0.000110896 a 11 1.626377 0.548304 0.019996674
g 22 0.533569 0.126315 0.39521833 a 22 1.666517 0.489423 4.87509E-06
g 33 0.383381 0.12275 0.171063035 a 33 2.115984 0.175854 2.72262E-20
g 44 0.546865 0.038757 0.113318185 a 44 2.056322 0.780928 0.023159515
g 55 0.024372 51.18033 0.495912859 a 55 1.683526 0.889139 0.091606246
g 66 0.319622 0.215415 0.201215351 a 66 3.123559 0.525182 3.02229E-07
g 16 0.459534 0.07297 0.289609966 a 15 0.254758 14.18534 0.493103571
g 23 0.620312 0.090278 0.091344774 a 16 1.061438 0.143995 4.88542E-05
g 56 0.473472 0.126587 0.417008016 a 23 1.190735 0.04016 5.83302E-65
a 56 -0.755504 17103787 0.5
          * probability that the true value of the coefficient lies on the opposite side of 0.5 than the point estimate.-    - 24
The short-run scale parameters are all substantially greater than 0.5, indicating significant increasing
marginal costs in the short run.   This appears consistent with the results of Kaparakis, Miller, and Noulas
(1994).
Scope Economies  A necessary and sufficient condition for long-run cost complementarities between
products i and j is that l ij <0, and for short-run cost complementarities, n ij <0.  The estimation results
are not consistent with the existence of cost complementarities:
Table 3
Coefficient Std.Error p-value Coefficient Std.Error p-value
l 15 0.09333 0.154031 0.5446 n 14 0.460942 136.5392 0.9973
l 16 -0.01545 0.032797 0.6376 n 15 4.59E-07 1.58E-06 0.7707
l 23 0.001395 0.003181 0.6609 n 16 1.05E-07 9.50E-08 0.267
l 56 0.016984 0.05546 0.7594 n 36 0.157856 25732798 1.0000
None of the cross-terms are significantly different from zero; these results are consistent with the
hypothesis that there are no cost complementarities, either short-run or long-run, in banking.  Note that
the existence of short-run fixed costs implies that simply spreading these fixed costs across several product
lines does give rise to a weak form of scope economies.
Demand Elasticities Also estimated is the matrix of demand self- and cross-flexibilities  h h.  Only six of the
21 flexibilities are significant at the 10% level, so that the results are suggestive rather than significant.
In order to present the results in a more familiar format, the inverse e e = = h h
-1of self- and cross-elasticities
is shown in Table 4.
Table 4 - Elasticity Matrix
1 2 3 4 5 6
1 0.421107 0.29976 -0.15746 0.305835 0.007331 0.194665
2 0.29976 0.658294 0.134493 -0.10661 -0.23474 0.089791
3 -0.15746 0.134493 0.02365 -0.06503 -0.06634 0.485121
4 0.305835 -0.10661 -0.06503 0.275833 -0.06198 0.405255
5 0.007331 -0.23474 -0.06634 -0.06198 0.067438 0.157416
6 0.194665 0.089791 0.485121 0.405255 0.157416 0.280526
Bias Parameters   The bank-specific bias parameter represents the ratio of planned-for demand to expected
demand for each bank.  The theory of the model suggests that  ex post costs are minimized if this ratio is-    - 25
one, and costs increase as this ratio increases or decreases.  A bias parameter is separately estimated for
each bank.  Of the 219 banks in the sample, 218 had sufficient data to estimate  m
k .  The distribution is
shown below:




























The mean ratio of planned-for demand to expected demand is 1.10, indicating substantial overcapacity on
average.  While a few banks are seriously pessimistic in their forecasting, most banks appear rather
aggressive in installing capacity to meet future needs. 76% of the banks had bias parameters significantly
greater than 1 at the 90% level.
Before concluding that US banks are deficient in capacity planning, two questions must be answered.
First, is this mismatch of demand and capacity an efficient response to forecast uncertainty?  In Appendix
A, a model of optimal capacity choice is developed in which banks may optimally choose a capacity level
that does not correspond to expected demand.  A few key results from the Appendix A analysis: (i) this
planned-for demand need not equal expected demand; under simplifying assumptions, it is optimal to
provide for {more than, less than, the same as} the expected quantity, as  aii {>,<,=} 0.5; and (ii) under
reasonable bounding assumptions about  aii  and forecast error, the theoretical difference between planned-
for demand and expected demand is quite small, most likely less than ½%.  A testable hypothesis of this
paper is that banks have consistent biases in their capacity planning; some banks overestimate how much
demand they will serve while others underestimate. The results of Appendix A suggest that such
“efficient” over (or under) capacity is likely to be very small.  Therefore, our empirical finding of
substantial mismatches between capacity and demand is almost surely the result of inefficient bias, and
not an efficient response to forecast uncertainty.-    - 26
It is also possible that mismatches between demand and capacity come about because the underlying
process in non-stationary, and thus particularly costly to forecast well.  However, the results of Appendix
A suggest that even a simple-minded forecasting method seems to outperform the bank average,
suggesting that it is not the difficulty of the forecasting problem that is leading to these mismatches.
Second, does this mismatch matter?  It could be that such mismatches result in only a very small increase
in cost, so it would not be optimal to invest much effort into getting the forecast right.  A direct test of this
would be to examine the ratio of short-run to long-run costs as computed from the model.  Unfortunately,
the fact that many of the parameters of the nonlinear model are not statistically significant leads to this
ratio being more noise than information; in particular, this calculated ratio is less than one for about 35%
of the observations, contrary to the theory.  In a less direct method of assessing the cost of bias, the ratio of
total cost to total revenues was regressed against a quadratic function of the bias parameter (assuming
orthogonality with other coefficients), with the following results:
Table 5 - Cost/Revenue vs. Bias
Coefficient Std. Error T-Statistic
Constant 1.622114 0.166863 9.721210
m -1.465286 0.314564 -4.658150
m
2 0.743318 0.147404 5.042740
While the theory suggests that this function should be minimized at  m = 1, there is nothing in the data
that forces this to be the case.  Therefore, it is surprising that the minimum of this empirically fitted









































Figure 6 - Fitted Cost/Revenue vs. Bias-    - 27
This suggests that biased forecasts can be costly, especially those of large magnitude.  On balance,
however, the quadratic model applied to the bias parameter estimates yields the result that the average
cost increase associated with biased capacity planning amounts to 2.2% of costs (with standard deviation
of 2%).  While this appears small relative to the 10% average over-forecasting, it is in fact a rather large
number compared to the average bank margin of 7.8% (earnings/costs).  On average, over 25% of bank
earnings are absorbed by the costs of the allocative inefficiency of demand/capacity mismatches.
However, allocative inefficiency is not the only possible cost of poor forecasting.  Since most banks seem
to err on the side of overcapacity, banks may increase their risk as a result.  Excess capacity and low
marginal cost may tempt bank managers to lower their credit standards to find enough customers to “fill
the pipeline.” This hypothesis implies that the bias parameter and the risk/earnings ratio will be positively
correlated.  The data does not confirm this hypothesis, however; the relationship is actually somewhat
negative.
It is also possible that excess capacity could translate into higher quality; more branches, for example,
could lead to greater convenience for customers, who might then be willing to pay a price premium and/or
give more business to the bank.  For C&I loans, we have a direct measure of quality, which is not
correlated with the bias parameter.  For all other products, the bias parameter shows either no correlation
with prices and quantities or else a small negative correlation.  Thus, higher capacity is not correlated
with quality, either measured directly or via prices and quantities.  The bias parameter thus represents
allocative inefficiency.
Fixed Effects  Past research using fixed effects and frontier methods showed that there was a significant
amount of unexplained cost/profit variation among banks.  A primary objective of the structural modeling
of this paper is to explain as much of this variation as possible.  To the extent this objective is met, any
remaining fixed effects should be small and/or insignificant.  In fact, we find that very few of the
estimated fixed effects in this model are statistically significant.  The distribution of the  p-values for the
fixed effect coefficients is shown below in  Figure 7.-    - 28

































































Only 13 of the 219 fixed effect coefficients are significant at the 5% level, and only 19 are significant at
the 20% level.  It is likely that the most significant thirteen fixed effect coefficients do represent bank
differences, but the remaining banks (96% of banks) show no variation.
In view of the economic significance of fixed effects/frontier methods found by the recent literature, this
result is quite strong.  It suggests that the unobserved efficiency differences which caused substantial
variations among banks have by and large been captured in the structural model presented here.  The
inefficiencies in risk management and capacity planning observed in the structural model appear to reflect
virtually all of the inefficiencies that were manifested in previous research via fixed effects/frontier
methods.
To test the hypothesis that it is the structure of the model that accounts for the relatively insignificant
fixed effect coefficients, a simple reduced form model, with fixed effects,
16 was estimated:











The reduced form estimation was carried out using the quarterly dataset and the same cost and quantity
data used in the structural estimation.  In the reduced form model, the fixed effects coefficients  B
k  are
much more significant than in the structural model; 128 banks (58%) had coefficients significant at the
20% level in the reduced form model, compared with 19 banks (10%) in the structural model.  The
distributions of p-values of B
k  (structural model) and B
k  (reduced form) are shown in  Figure 8:-    - 29








































































17 between the two distributions of  p-values makes it clear that the very substantial
significance of the fixed effects coefficients in the reduced form model by and large fades away in the
structural model.
18  What is unexplained variation in the reduced form model is explained using the
structural model.
Other Estimation Problems   It will be recalled that the cost function did not include input prices, as theory
would suggest.  This formulation is valid as long as input prices are constant across time and across
banks.  In order to test the time-independence assumption, the model was estimated using year dummies;
all year coefficients were zero.  This suggests that using constant dollars captures the full effect of time in
the operating results estimation, in contrast to the risk estimation in which year is important.
However, there may still be variation in input prices across regions of the country.  While the cost of
capital and other materials is not likely to vary by region, it is possible for both labor costs and land costs
to vary considerably.  Two regions of the US suggest themselves as high-cost candidates: New York and
California.  To test for such differences in costs, the model was estimated using dummy variables to
represent location in one of these regions.  Chicago was also included as a relatively low-cost region.  All
three regional coefficients were zero.  These results are consistent with the hypothesis that input prices
can be safely ignored.
Finally, the nonlinear and iterative nature of the estimation is cause for concern that the parameter
estimates may depend upon the starting points.  Although the size of the problem precluded extensive
testing, all results were verified by starting the estimation process at least three different initial values,
with no effect on the outcome.  It should be recalled, however, that the variance-covariance matrix derived-    - 30
from nonlinear regressions is at best an approximation to the true matrix.  Therefore, the quoted standard
errors should be viewed with this reservation in mind.
Quality Estimation  The fact that many banks are willing to pay Greenwich Associates for customer
satisfaction survey data year after year suggests that quality is important to banks.  There are several ways
in which the effect of quality on a bank is realized: cost, price, and demand.
Cost  As discussed above, the operating results estimation was completed on the full 6190-observation
dataset.  The fitted model was used to evaluate two terms: those relating to costs of C&I loans ( C3 ) and
all other costs (C-3 ):
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This equation was estimated on the 476-observation dataset, with the following results:
Table 6 - Cost-Quality Estimation
Coefficient Std. Error T-statistic p-value
q 1.769108 0.049293 35.88932 0.0000
d 0.011379 0.003201 3.554510 0.0000
R
2   0.702536 AdjustedR
2 0.701908
log likelihood -4469.949 F-statistic 1119.470
Clearly, quality increases cost but not very much.  The elasticity parameter is statistically significant but
not economically significant; doubling quality only increases costs by 1%.  For example, increasing
quality from the median level of 51 to the 75th percentile level of 59, a 15% change, increases costs by on
0.15%.
Price  High quality firms are often able to command a price premium for their services.  Four-star hotels,
high-end jewelers, and other retailers seem to earn rents from the higher prices they are able to charge.  In
some cases, though, higher quality commands only a very small price premium, but does lead to higher
volume.  Some department stores well-known for quality stay price-competitive but handle higher volume
with greater efficiency.-    - 31
The model log log p X 3 = + q f was estimated, with the following results:
    Table 7 - Price-Quality Estimation
Coefficient Std. Error T-statistic p-value
q 0.039351 0.019669 2.000693 0.0460




log likelihood 972.0862 F-statistic 4.384192
Clearly, there are many factors other than quality which affect price.  It is the case that quality does affect
price positively (as is expected); again, the result is statistically significant but not economically
significant; doubling quality permits a mere 1% price premium.
However, thought both the quality elasticity of cost and of price are small, they are statistically significant
and it is of interest to note that they are essentially equal.  The small increase in cost from higher quality
is recovered in the equally small increase in the price premium the bank can charge for quality; margins
do not suffer at all with higher quality.
Quantity  Does quality affect the quantity demanded?  The estimation of this relationship is substantially
more difficult.  A simple regression of quantity on quality does indeed lead to a strongly positive and
significant elasticity; however, this may merely mean that large banks are better at providing good service.
In order to sort out whether quantity leads to greater quality (economies of scale in quality provision) or
quality leads to greater quantity (a market response to better service), several models were estimated that
included proxies for size as well as the quality measure.
The literal interpretation of the model suggests that the only reason banks differ in size is because of their
capacity choices.  Thus, the first model uses the bias parameter as a size proxy:
log log log q X m
k
3 0 1 2 = + + q q q .  The second model uses total revenues as a size proxy in linear
form: q X R 3 0 1 2 = ¢ + ¢ + ¢ q q q .  The third model (unreported here) uses a combination of
q q q 1 2 6 , ,    and  in quadratic form, with equally strong results.  The estimated coefficients from the first
two models:
Table 8 - Quantity-Quality Estimation-    - 32
Coefficient Std. Error T-statistic p-value
                                     Model 1 Model 1
q 0 5.954614 0.793794 7.501460 0.0000
q 1 0.980932 0.203279 4.825551 0.0000
q 2 -3.058770 0.510000 -5.997588 0.0000
                                     Model 2                                      Model 2
¢ q 0 -24122.57 6444/394 -3.743187 0.0002
¢ q 1 607.5021 125.4451 4.842772 0.0000
¢ q 2 8.252161 0.266152 31.00547 0.0000
Using different proxies for size all lead to strongly positive significant elasticities, ranging from 0.16 to
0.98.
This set of results is consistent with the hypothesis that though banks cannot command a price premium
for quality, it is a means of attracting and keeping customers.  Once a bank adapts itself to a high-quality
technology, they can realize greater demand at about the same cost.
If quality is effectively free and it generates a demand flow, then why don’t all banks provide high quality
service to their customers?  The previous discussion argued that the technology for providing quality
service involved a difficult adaptation by the bank and so is diffusing slowly in the industry.  Successful
adopters can achieve the benefits at almost no cost, so profits can be earned during this diffusion period.
Profit  The above results suggest that quality should have a positive impact on profit.  We test this directly
by estimating a simple profit-quality relationship.  Once again, size must be controlled for.  Both revenues
and the bias parameter were used as size controls, with similar results.  We report on the model
¢ = + + p q q q 0 1 2 X R :
   Table 9 - Profit-Quality Estimation
Coefficient Std. Error T-statistic p-value
q 0 -542.0245 441.7871 -1.226891 0.2205
q 1 16.04065 8.599727 1.865251 0.0628
q 2 0.065855 0.018246 3.609369 0.0003
Quality has the expected sign and is significant at the 6% level.-    - 33
6. Conclusions
A model of banking markets is developed which explicitly incorporates risk, customer service quality,
capacity planning, short-run and long-run cost functions, and market equilibrium.  The model is estimated
in structural form, using data from operating results, capital markets, and customer surveys.  The
principal findings are:
(i) Banks differ widely in their ability to manage risk; larger banks take on relatively more risk; on
average, risk cost accounts for 38% of bank earnings.
(ii) There are substantial inefficiencies due to demand/capacity mismatches.  On average, banks are over-
optimistic by 10% in the demand they plan for, and this cost them about 2.2% of total costs.  This is
substantially more than can be justified by “optimal overshooting” in the face of planning uncertainty,
and amounts to over 25% of average bank margin.
(iii) Greater customer satisfaction correlates with greater profitability, principally due to greater demand;
the effect of quality on cost and price is minimal.
(iv) Bank-specific fixed effects are relatively insignificant; the very significant bank-specific effects that
previous research discovered appear to have been largely captured and directly estimated in the
structural model.
(v) Confirmation of the results of previous research that there are no significant long-run economies of
scale or scope.
The paper employs methodological innovations as well:
(i) The Capital Asset Pricing Model is used to measure bank risk, thereby capturing all risk in a measure
based on market behavior.
(ii) The ability of banks to satisfy their customers is examined for the first time in this literature, and it is
shown to be a source of profitability; a new dataset is introduced to study this phenomenon.
(iii) Structural model estimation is used to expand the range of questions that can be empirically
addressed; it is also used to explain and directly estimate inefficiencies hitherto captured only by
inference in fixed effects models.-    - 34
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Appendix A
A Model of Optimal Capacity Choice Based on Demand Forecasting   Bank k has available to it certain
public information I
  and certain private information I
k  regarding their demand for the next period.
Using this information, bank  k  estimates the cumulative distribution function of its next-period demand
as G I I G
k k ( ; , ) ( ) x x = .  The parameters depend upon both public and private information, so they need
not be the same for all banks.
Bank k chooses the technology  (~ ,~ ) F
k k c that minimizes its expected cost (assuming risk neutrality): 
(~ ,~ ) argmin ( ) ( )
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To simplify the analysis, we consider the case in which all products are independent, both in the economic




i ( ) ( ) ( ) x x = =￿ ).  In this case, the short-
run and long-run cost functions are (removing redundant double subscripts)
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Evaluating the expected cost in the single-product case, we obtain
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
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Differentiating this with respect to qi and setting the result equal to zero yields
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so that the optimal “planned-for” demand is-    - 37










The actual technology ( F,c) can be determined by substituting (A3) into (A2).
Clearly, for ai  = 0.5 (short-run constant marginal cost), the optimal capacity to install is that which
corresponds with the mean demand: ~ q q i
k
i
k = .  It is easy to show that for  ai =1 (short-run increasing
marginal cost), the optimal capacity corresponds to planned-for demand greater than the mean demand:
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0, for all ai >
0, assuming the support of gi
k  is strictly positive.  We can therefore conclude that in the independent
product case, it is optimal to provide for {more than, less than, the same as} the expected quantity, as  ai
{>,<,=} 0.5.
If banks are making unbiased demand forecasts (in the sense that on average expected demand equals
actual demand), then observed mismatches between actual demand and installed capacity may be efficient
in that the mismatch may be an efficient response to forecast uncertainty and the nonlinear cost function.
On the other hand, such mismatches could also be due to consistently biased demand forecasts, which
would be inefficient.  This could occur if, for example, bank managers are consistently over-optimistic
about next period demand, consistently installed excess capacity as a result, and did not learn from past
mistakes.  Is it possible to distinguish between efficient mismatches of demand and capacity and
inefficient mismatches?
Some simple numerical examples suggest that efficient mismatching of demand and capacity is unlikely to
be significant in practice.  In the empirical results below, we find the average  ai  to be 2.04.  To bound the
coefficient of variation of the forecast distribution, we analyzed the simplest possible forecast method:
next period’s demand will equal last period’s demand.  Applying this method to the data for all six
products yields an overall empirical coefficient of variation of 0.085.  Assuming a normal forecast
distribution, this leads to planned-for demand 1.1% larger than expected demand.  Of course, this
simplest possible forecast method should be easy to beat; if bank forecasters can reduce the coefficient of
variation by half (a very modest target, it would seem), then planned-for demand is only 0.3% larger than
expected demand.  In the case at hand, efficient mismatching of demand and capacity are not significant;
in the following, mismatching of demand and capacity will be attributed to inefficiently biased forecasts.-    - 38
Appendix B
The Greenwich Associates’ Dataset
Greenwich Associates is a strategic research and consulting firm for financial service providers, offering
over 60 programs in commercial banking, investment management, stockbroking, bond dealing,
investment banking, and foreign exchange dealing.  The firm has been in business and conducting
financial market research since 1972.
Each year Greenwich Associates conducts 32,000 interviews with senior financial officers at corporations
in 19 countries.  The data collected from these interviews captures qualitative information on the
satisfaction of clients with their current providers of financial services.
Research in the US corporate credit market is split into three programs:
Large Corporate Banking  research (covering companies with over $500 million in sales) has
over 1200 respondents. Nearly 75% of the population is covered and the research is conducted
annually.
Middle Market Banking  (companies with sales of $50-500 million) interviews officials at over
3000 companies. Roughly half of the population is covered and the research is conducted every
odd numbered year.
Commercial Banking  (companies with sales of $5-50 million) analyzes the performance of over
300 banks on a state-by-state basis.  Approximately 20,000 interviews are conducted, giving a
coverage rate of 20% of the population. Regions covered rotate in a two year cycle.
Bank clients are asked to describe their relationship with the specific bank; the types of relationship are:
Customer: This means that the corporation has been a customer of the bank over the period
covered by the survey.
Principal Bank: The bank is one of the corporation’s three or four most important banks.
Lead Bank: The bank is the corporation’s main or first bank.
Data collected for this study from the Large Corporate and Middle Markets was based on relationships of
type “Principal Bank,“ while data from Commercial Banking was based on relationships of type-    - 39
“Customer.“ So the Competitive Situation Report for Large Corporate Banking, for example, would show
what percentage of clients from relationship type “Principal Bank“ indicated a positive response to a
question.
As might be expected, the survey instrument is quite large, and varies from year to year as well as from
segment to segment.  In order to ensure as much uniformity across the sample as possible, eight specific
questions were selected.  These questions appear in all survey instruments in all years in all market
segments.  On the basis of a principal components analysis, Greenwich Associates avers that these
questions capture the key elements of customer satisfaction.  In summary form, these questions are:
A) How Do You Rate This Bank in:
i-willingness to lend
ii- competitive loan pricing
iii- cash management capabilities
iv- international service capabilities
B) How Do You Rate This Bank’s Account Officers in:
i-convincing bank to meet credit needs
ii- prompt follow-up
iii- knowledge of cash manage ment services
iv- advice on corporate finance
For each question, the respondent had five choices:
1- Poor 2- Fair 3- Good4- Very Good 5-Excellent
For each of the items above, the average percent of respondents who rated the bank a “4” or “5”, referred
to as “Above Average,“ is recorded, and constitutes the core data of this study.
The dataset consists of observations on 112 banks over several years between 1985 and 1992, resulting in
a total of 476 usable observations. Each observation consists of data drawn from the three market
segments, each of which has:
1) the number of customer respondents;
2) for each of the eight questions, the percentage of all respondents who rated the bank “Above
Average“; and
3) the average revenue for respondents in this segment (from Dun and Bradstreet).-    - 40
The overall index is constructed as follows:
• For each market segment (Large Corporate, Middle Market, and Commercial), the average of (2)
above for all eight questions was computed. In each segment, this measure was Z-score normalized.
•  The three normalized indices were combined by weighting them by the average size of clients in each
market and the number of clients each bank had in each market and then adding them together.
•  This produced an index with mean zero and a unit standard deviation. The range of the index was
from -4.23 to 4.40.
 This index was then re-scaled, so that -4.23 was mapped to “1” and 4.4 was mapped to “100.”  This
yields a resulting index ranging from 1 to 100, with a mean of 50.-    - 41
-- Notes --
1 The extensive literature on the efficacy of bank mergers is included in this category as well.
2 Not all bank risk is captured in the shareowners’ perspective; the fact that failed banks are frequently
bailed out transfers some default risk from  shareowners to taxpayers.
3 There are, of course, many ways in which quality can be defined.  Operational measures, such as
mishandled checks, data entry errors, etc., are used by virtually all banks to monitor the quality they
provide their customers.  Customer-based measures, such as overall satisfaction, are more subjective and
perhaps less precise, as they involve interview methods.  However, it is our view that quality is in the eye
of the customer, not the process engineer; consequently, we opt for the latter measure: customer
satisfaction is quality, for our purposes.
4 Omitting futures contracts from this analysis may bias the risk results, in that such contracts are often
used to hedge a bank’s other assets.
5 For ease of exposition, we postpone consideration of the measure of quality and how it affects the short-
and long-run cost functions until the section below on Customer Satisfaction.
6 Using markets to measure risk of banks, rather than accounting ratios, regulatory measures, or
“industry-watcher” ratings, has both strengths and weaknesses.  Its strengths:
Market risk measures are forward-looking  rather than based on historical evidence.
Market measures are determined via transactions among buyers and sellers who have a high
stake in getting their information right.
Market measures incorporate  all the risk of a bank: market risk, business risk, asset risk, liability
risk, and so forth.  It also measures  net risk, in that risks undertaken which are appropriately
hedged are not counted (as opposed to certain regulatory measures).
Market measures are easily observed and do not rely on judgments of “experts” who may be
unreliable or not disinterested.  Such measures are difficult to “fudge.”
On the other hand, there are weaknesses as well:
Internal measures of risk within banks, at the transaction level, the departmental level, or even
the corporate level, may not easily translate into an external market measure.  Therefore,
disaggregation of market measures to operating units and validation against internal risk
measures will prove difficult.
Market measures are only available for institutions with tradable securities, which in many cases
may be holding companies.  The performance of banks held by such firms may not be adequately
reflected in the risk measures of the parent.
Banks typically disclose significantly less information than non-bank firms, and therefore
investors have less information on which to base their trades of bank stocks.-    - 42
                                                                                                                                                                    
To the extent that Federal bailouts shield  shareowners from some default risk, and  debtholders
from almost all such risk, some idiosyncratic risk may not be captured in this market measure.
On balance, we conclude that using the bank’s stock market beta is likely to be the most reliable measure
of aggregate bank risk available.
7 Let rf be the risk-free rate (say, on short-term US Treasury bills) and  rm be the rate of return on the
market as a whole (say, the S&P 500).  The bank’s  b satisfies the Capital Asset Pricing Model equation:
s r r r f m f = + - b( ) .
8 If we were willing to forego bank-specific coefficient estimates for total-sample estimates, then it is
obvious a richer model could be estimated.  However, we suspect that the interesting variation is among
banks rather than among products; we prefer an approximate solution to the more interesting problem
rather than a more precise solution to the less interesting problem.
9 Again, we postpone discussion of quality and how it affects the demand functions until the section below
on Customer Satisfaction.
10 By way of analogy, consider the technology shift that occurred in Japanese automobile manufacturing
firms in the 1970s.  To a first approximation, this shift could be characterized as from a “do it fast, fix
your mistakes later” model to a “do it right the first time” model.  At the time of its adoption by Japanese
firms, it appears that this new technology permitted both higher quality and lower cost, enabling them to
compete well against the then-dominant American firms.  It might be thought that this new approach
would be quickly adopted by American firms as they lost domestic market share.  Such was not the case; it
appears that successfully adopting this technology requires substantial changes in work and management
practices which American firms were only able to effect in the 1990s, which implies a diffusion delay of
nearly two decades.
11 and possibly real estate loans as well.  For  expositional purposes, we shall assume it affects only C&I
loans.
12 The notion that firms make capital choices prior to making price and output choices is common in both
theory and practice.  For example,  Economides (1993) reviews this point, quoting various recent papers.
13 In order to smooth out variations in market-wide  observables, we estimated the difference  r r m f -  from
the data as 0.088, which we use throughout.  In addition, several methods for estimating  g were tried,
including a linear trend and an exponential trend of the actual data.  In both cases, a substantial number
of negative growth rates, as well as growth rates that led to a negative value of the firm, were encountered.
As a result, the growth rate was not used in computing the risk cost.
14 The second hypothesis is  disconfirmed below.
15 The annual sample was included to determine if the estimation was sensitive to the elimination of non-
end-of-year data.  Some have suggested that banks are less serious about quarterly results than they are
about end-of-year results, and may even view such intermediate results as “window dressing,” shading
their estimates optimistically.  Our results do not support such allegations.
16 Berger (1993) compared using fixed effects (his “Method 2”) to measure X-inefficiency with using
average residuals (“Method 1”).  While recognizing the limitations of average residuals, he finds them-    - 43
                                                                                                                                                                    
superior to fixed effects in that the latter appeared to capture scale effects which should be picked up by
the model parameters, at least in his study.  We do not find that result in this analysis.  Nevertheless,
Figure 8 was re-calculated using the p-values of average residuals, and the result is essentially the same:
far greater significance for the reduced form model than the structural model.
17 Comparison of the significance of the fixed effects coefficients with the significance of fixed effects(or
average residuals or frontiers) from previous research is not possible, as none of the studies of which the
author is aware report the standard errors of these estimates.
18 The difference in the significance of the fixed effects in the two models is also seen when each model is
tested for the hypothesis that  all fixed effects are zero (clearly rejected in both cases).  For the structural
model, the resulting F-statistic is 1.28; for the reduced form model, the  F-statistic is 6.69.